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This thesis examines the various methods the Navy has used
to develop and foster competition. It also discusses the
economic analysis of using more than one source of supply.
Rising costs and budgetary pressures have forced the Navy to
reexamine itz & .... acqui %J1., process. With the impending force
draw down, the Program Manager is faced with reduced quantity
requirements. Since the enactment of the Competition in
Contracting Act in 1984, the Navy has required the use of dual
sources in major weapons systems. However, this method of
acquisition may no longer be economically feasible. Faced
with reduced requirements and limited resources, the Program
Manager must reevaluate the costs and benefits of his
acquisition method.
This thesis examines the economic issues the Program
Manager must consider when reconsidering the dual source
acquisition method and presents a decision model to assist in
evaluating which programs would yield an economic benefit by
down selecting to one source of supply.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH
Under the present climate of shrinking budgets, reduction
of forces, and the resultant reduction in material
requirements, the Department of Defense (DoD) finds itself
having to reexamine its acquisition methods to ensure all
requirements can be met at a reasonable cost to taxpayers.
During the 1980's the use of dual source competition was
required in major systems acquisition wherever possible. Dual
source competition required a second source of supply, whether
pre-existing or purposely generated to fulfill this role.
Creating or convincing a vendor who is not already established
or producing to become a second source of supply for a program
can be both costly and difficult. Often a considerable amount
of investment by the Government is required initially in order
to introduce an additional source of supply to establish dual
competition in weapons acquisition.
Rising costs and budgetary pressures are unlikely to allow
procurement in the 1990's at the rate the Services have
projected. Therefore, in the coming years there might not be
sufficient quantities required to support and justify the
continued use of more than one contractor. For this reason
the Navy is investigating programs to determine whether
1
reducing the number of suppliers to a single source will
result in cost reductions.
Although the 1984 Competition in Contracting Act mandated
the legal obligation to incorporate competition into defense
acquisition, budget constraints have necessitated reevaluation
of the use of dual sources as a means of competition and as a
method of increasing benefits to the Government.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the economic
logic used by the Program Manager to support the decision to
buy a reduced requirement from a single source of supply. The
emphasis will be on programs already in production.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following specific question will be addressed during
this study.
1. Primary Research Question
What will be the impact on production cost, given the
decision to revert to a single source from a dual source
acquisition method, and how might these costs be minimized?
2. Subsidiary Research Ouestions
- What are the essential differences between the key
production costs when going from dual sources to a single
source?
- What action should the Government and contractor take to
minimize production costs?
- Can a model be developed to determine which programs are
no longer candidates for dual source acquisition?
- What can be expected in pricing during buy-out?
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C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The informational research methodology employed in this
study consisted of the following methods:
- Literature search was used to identify and obtain
information on the policy and legislation which initially
directed competition in general and dual source methods
in particular.
- Interviews with cost analysts, contracting personnel, and
representatives from the Office of the Competiticn
Advocate General were conducted to discuss the rationale
for selecting and the effects of dual source methods of
competition.
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
A brief overview of the requirement to use competitive
procedures and of the methods available to foster competition,
emphasizing the process of dual source competition, will be
presented in Chapter II.
Chapter III will provide an analysis of the literature
review and interviews concerning the present economic decision
making process.
Chapter IV will propose a decision model to be applied in
the current DoD scenario when making the decision to revert to
a sole source contracting method.
Finally, Chapter V presents the conclusions and
recommendations of the author. Included are answers to the





In recent years competition has become the norm in major
systems acquisition. With the growing pressures from the
Administration, Congress, and the general public to reduce
spending, DoD decision makers are under a mandate to use
scarce resources wisely. Competition is considered a useful
tool in constraining cost increases.
Competition, as conducted within DoD, requires that at
least two qualified suppliers of a product or service be
willing to provide it at prices which are determined by
bidding. Bidding will presumably result in a lower cost
because suppliers will increase their efficiency and may
decrease their profit margins in order tC successfully
compete. A lower price is not always the only consideration
in competitive procurement; quality and industrial base
concerns may also influence procurement decisions. [Ref. l:p.
5-2) However, primarily because of the widely held belief
that competition can significaintly reduce the cost of
acquiring major weapon systems, the requirement to compete has
been made law.
The primary focus of this thesis is on dual sourcing as a
method of procurement and the methods used to determine its
benefits. Dual sourcing, for the purpose of this thesis, is
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defined as a procurement technique wherein two or more sources
respond to a Government solicitation representing a total
requirement which will be split among the two sources. The
larger share will normaliy go to the lower priced supplier and
a smaller share or a minimum sustaining rate is guaranteed to
the higher priced producer.
This chapter will present a brief overview of the history
of how dual sourcing came to be as prominent as it is today.
A discussion of the various methods of dual source acquisition
* ill also be presented.
B. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Over the years, politicians and defense procurement
critics have agreed that the degree of competition in the
production phase of the acquisition programs could be
increased by expanding the use of the dual-source procurement
technique. The common belief was that by maintaining at least
two sources of supply throughout this phase, the benefits of
competition, specifically that of lower contract prices, would
result. These beliefs culminated with the passage of the
Competition in Contracting Act.
Public Law 98-369, the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA), became effective in April of 1985. Prior to CICA,
dual sourcing was primarily used when technical, delivery, or
cost problems with the sole source contractor necessitated the
development of an alternate source of supply. CICA provided
5
statutory authority for establishing a second source based on
expected cost reduction, mobilization, or the need to maintain
an essential experimental, research, or developmental
capability. [Ref. 2:p. 2]
Also during 1985, Public Law 99-145, the 1985 DoD
Authorization Act, provided that in developing acquisition
strategies for systems and major sub-systems, competitive
alternative sources would be utilized throughout the period
from the beginning of full scale development (FSD) through the
end of production.
CICA provided waivers to the requirement to use
alternative sources during FSD if the Secretary determined
their use inappropriate for any of the following reasons:
- Where use of alternate sources would not reduce
technological risk.
- Where the additional cost of developing an alternate
source would not result in a commensurate improvement in
design.
- Where use of an alternate source would unduly delay
fulfilling DoD's requirement.
- Where national security would be adversely affected.
During production, the use of an alternate source may only be
waived when the Secretary determines that its use would:
- Increase total proqram costs.
- Cause unacceptable delays in delivering the product to
DoD.
- Be adverse to national security.
6
Even prior to the enactment of the above legislation,
Public Law 98-212, the DoD Appropriations Act of 1984,
required a plan for the development of two or more sources for
production of any system or subsystem funded by the Act. Only
upon certification that the system or subsystem being
developed was being procured in quantities insufficient to
justify development of two or more production sources could
the requirement for competition be waived. This requirement
has been included in each succeeding year's appropriation act.
SECNAVINST 4210.6A, "Acquisition Policy," dated 13 April 1988
includes these requirements as part of the Navy's policy on
the use of dual sources.
Through directives and instruction, the DoD provides the
program manager with additional guidance concerning
competition. DoD Directive 5000.1 presents competition as one
of the primary acquisition management principles. DoD
Instruction 5000.2 places heavy emphasis on review of the
program's acquisition strategy, including both design and
price competition at major milestones.
C. TECHNIQUES USED IN COMPETITIVE PRODUCTION
While the focus of this thesis is upon dual source
decisions concerning programs well along in the FSD phase or
already into production, it is important to note that
competition is required at all stages of the acquisition
7
process. During the Concept Exploration/Definition phase,
there may be competitive research and development contracts
awarded to develop concepts in parallel.
Competitive exrloration of alternative systems allows the
Government to take full advantage of industry's innovative
talents and enables the evaluation of risks early in the
acquisition cycle. [Ref. 3:p. 8] The most promising concepts
are chosen for further exploration. In recent years, the
Government has relied upon the use of critical component
prototyping as early as the Concept Validation phase. This
concept leads to a reduction of the technical uncertainties
accompanying the various concepts and enhances verification
"that the chosen concepts are sound, perform in an operational
environment, and provide a basis for selection of the system
design concept to be developed into Full Scale Development
(FSD)." [Ref. 4:p. 16]
During FSD, competition continues with the solicitation of
the requirement to develop and document a system which is both
affordable and capable of satisfying the mission need. During
this phase, independent test and evaluation is conducted by
the Government through the requirement to use competitive
prototypes in shoot-offs, fly-offs, and sail-offs to
demonstrate capability. At the conclusion of this phase the
decision whether to proceed into production is made.
Since this thesis is primarily concerned with the decision
to change the acquisition method during the production phase,
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a discussion of the five most common methods of generating
alternate sources during that phase will follow. This section
will address those methods and their major advantages and
disadvantages. The five methods to be described are: form-
fit-function (F3), technical data package, directed licensing,
leader-follower, and contractor teams.
1. Fcrm-Fit-Function (F3)
This method does not require the use of a technical
data package (TDP) nor interaction between production sources.
Alternate sources are provided with functional specifications
regarding parameters such as overall performance, size,
weight, and external configuration, among others. This is the
classic "black box" concept where internal design commonality
is not required. It is useful for the acquisition of
expendable, non-repairable items where the ability of the
system to perform as required is not dependent on what is
inside the "box."
The primary advantage to this method is that it offers
an easy means to solicit competition. Additionally, because
there is no technical data package, the Government need not
spend time and effort in validation. Finally, because each
contractor is free to pursue any method of meeting the
requirement, innovation often results in a lower overall unit
cost because the contractor designs the system based upon its
existing manufacturing processes.
9
One of the major disadvantages of this method occurs
when the product requires logistics support. If the internal
configuration of the item produced by competing sources is
radically different, spares and test equipment may present a
problem in the field. However, this can be minimized by the
careful selection of systems/products to be procured by this
method. [Ref. 5:p. 54]
2. Technical Data Package
A stand alone technical data package is used to
generate alternate sources to produce an item. A Level III
technical data package will normally be obtained under the
original development or production contract. According to
SECNAVINST 4210.9 of 25 January 1988, a Level III package
consists of the complete set of engineering drawings and
instructions which fully describe characteristics of each
component part, subassembly and end item, as well as detailed
physical and performance characteristics, quality assurance
provisions, materials to be used, and manufacturing processes
to be followed.
The major advantage of using the technical data
package technique lies in the fact that once the Government
has validated the technical data package, it can be used
repeatedly to foster and maintain competition. Additionally,
with a good technical data package, the technical, schedule
and cost risks involved with technology transfer are
minimized.
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However, the validation of the technical data package
represents a drawback to this method of competition. The
process of validation can be a costly and time consuming
effort and once the Government has validated the package, it
assumes responsibility for its accuracy. Additionally, the
acquisition of technical data can be a costly process if the
Government has not fundea or only partially funded the
development effort. [Ref. 6:p. 31] Finally, a major p-oblem
can arise should the developing contractor declare a critical
component to be proprietary and refuse to provide technical
data.
The TDP approach has been successfully used to develop
a second source in the AN/AYK-14 Standard Airborne Computer.
The Navy acquired data rights from Control Data Corporation
(CDC) in its original development contract. The Naval
Avionics Center (NAC) validated the data using the build to
print method to fabricate the end item. After NAC worked out
data problems directly with CDC, a second source was
solicited. Sperry, chosen as the second source, performed
another data verification while building their "learning"
quantity. By using NAC for guidance and technical support,
Sperry never had to deal directly with CDC.
With the exception of a proprietary memory module, for
which Sperry had to develop an alternate design, the AN/AYK-14
is being produced by both contractors from the same TDP.
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Spares and components from each contractor are fully
interchangeable. [Ref. 7:p. 36]
3. Directed Licensing
The licensing technique of establishing competitive
production sources is used when the original source has
patented all or selected processes or systems. A contractual
agreement exists allowing the Government to conduct
competition for production quantities, select a winner and
appoint him as a licensee. The developer or licensor will
provide technical assistance and manufacturing data to the
licensee in exchange for royalties or fees. The system
developer retains rights to proprietary data and maintains
system responsibility.
The main advantages of licensing are minimization of
the Government burden associated with technology transfer, the
introduction of competition early in the process and the
utilization of the developing contractor's unique
capabilities. The main disadvantages are the cost of
motivating the developer to enter into a licensing arrangement
and the potential for adversarial relationships between the
licensor and licensee. [Ref. 8:p. 2-13]
4. Leader-Follower.
The leader-follower technique achieves technical
transfer through the direct technical assistance from the
system developer (leader) to the second source (follower).
This technique is generally used when the second source would
12
be unable to produce without the developer's assistance.
Assistance involves training, technical assistance, material
support, vendor qualification, and detailed manufacturing
support to the second source.
The leader-follower technique is achieved in one of
three ways:
- The Government awards a prime contract to the producer
with a requirement to subcontract for a designated
portion of production to a specified follower and to
provide assistance to the follower in production of the
required end items.
- The Government awards a prime contract to the leader to
provide assistance to the follower who also has a prime
contract with the Government for production.
- The Government awards a prime contract to the follower
with the requirement for it to subcontract to the leader
for technical assistance. [Ref. 7:p. 40]
Methods one and two are most frequently employed.
The advantages of the leader-follower technique
include the minimization of the burden of technology transfer,
enhanced use of the leader's capabilities, and some reduction
in redundant hardware/software/firmware developments through
"lessons learned" communicated by the leader to the follower.
The primary disadvantages include the cost to motivate
or give incentive to the leader to participate, the potential
for adversarial relationships between the leader and follower,
and finally the managerial burden upon the Government to
oversee the process. [Ref. 8:p. 2-9]
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5. Contractor Teaming
Contractor teaming is the preferred method of
establishing competitive production sources as delineated in
SECNAVINST 4210.6A which states,
The development cycle of each program will begin with a
minimum of two contractors/contractor teams performing
concurrent, but separate development up to FSED at which
time it will normally be narrowed to two contractors
developing a system to one design. [Ref. 10:p. A-7]
This method involves formation of a team of two or more
contractors for the full scale development of a system. Each
team member designs and fabricates specific subsystems and
components of the system, with each ultimately sharing design
and manufacturing data with each other. The end result is two
or more qualified production sources for the complete system.
This technique may be accomplished through the award of a
prime contract to one of the team members with a requirement
to subcontract with the other team member, or by the
contractors entering into a joint venture arrangement and the
subsequent award of a prime contract to that joint venture.
The primary benefit of the teaming technique lies in
the fact that contractors are encouraged to be innovative
during the design phase, and this may result in identification
of two or more qualified production sources early in
production. The primary disadvantages to this technique occur
when the contractor teams engage in "finger pointing" when
difficulties occur, or when one team member is in a stronger
14
position and takes advantage of the weaker member. [Ref. 7:p.
40]
Of the five methods described above, F3 and directed
licensing are more suited to full and open competition. TDP,
leader-follower and contractor teams are the primary methods
of dual source contracting. While the program manager has
various methods available to develop second sources, there are
basic issues to be addressed prior to any decision to pursue
this method. In a recent memorandum for Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Under Secretary for Acquisition
posed the following issues to be addressed when analyzing the
use of competitive alternative sources for production.
1) Number of systems planned to be procured along with the
production rate profile, the potential minimum and maximum
quantities, and an estimate of the break-even point for
recovering dual-sourcing investments.
2) Identification of the assumptions made in performing the
cost-benefit analysis, including experience curve
projections and behavior during sole-source and dual-source
conditions, and adjustments made for changes in production
rate.
3) The Government and contractor nonrecurring costs
associated with tooling and test equipment.
4) The cost of educational buys and qualification testing,
including the added costs resulting from smaller buys from
the prime contractor during the learning and qualification
periods of the second source.
5) Method to be used in implementing the necessary
technology transfer, whether it be by data package, leader-
follower arrangement, or form, fit, and function. Depending
on the method to be used for the technology transfer, the
implications of any proprietary data or logistics impacts
will be included in the analysis.
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6) Planned methods for maintaining configuration
management.
7) A discussion of the supplier base capable of producing
the system to include whether there is any requirement to
develop different vendors from the current prime's vendors.
8) Currently budgeted funds compared to funding required to
implement the dual-sourcing arrangement. Total program
budgets should be included.
9) A discussion of the impact of alternative sources on
program schedule. [Ref. 10:Attachment A]
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the major methods of generating
alternative sources for production. The next chapter will
discuss the various elements and methods used in the analysis
of costs or benefits of dual sourcing.
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III. COST ESTIMATING AND COMPETITION MODELS
A. INTRODUCTION
Because the DoD policy is based upon a belief that
competition creates cost savings, any discussion of the
effects of competition usually includes a statement that
competition has reduced costs by a certain amount. In order
to arrive at that amount, it is necessary to have an estimate
of costs under different selling structures and production
rates, as well as a model to analyze the effects of
competition. This chapter will discuss the most commonly used
methods of cost estimating and the models frequently used by
DoD to project and analyze the effect of competition.
In the process of estimating costs for production, the
analyst must use historical data on "what systems did cost,
combine the theory and understanding of why the elements of
cost emerged with programmatic and technical variables of the
new system, and forecast what the new systems will cost."
[Ref. 12:p. 3)
While there are a number of cost estimation and analysis
techniques, the key element in all of them is that the data
must be complete, accurate and relevant, and the analyst must
know which data truly affect the analysis and which should be
discarded. The next section will briefly describe the three
17
generic cost estimating/analysis techniques known as bottom-up
engineering, analogy, and parametric methods.
B. COST ESTIMATING METHODS
1. Bottom-up Engineering Estimates
Bottom-up engineering estimates are based upon
detailed system specifications, drawings, and industrial
standards and require the estimation of costs from the lowest
level of work effort. The total cost is then estimated by
summing up all individual elements in the effort being
analyzed. These estimates are sensitive to design and
manufacturing changes and must be adjusted to reflect
integration costs, overhead, and administrative expenses.
Because this method is sensitive to design and manufacturing
processes and changes, it is well suited to identifying cost
driving elements. This method is best suited to well-defined
efforts because of its reliance on requirements for detailed
information. [Ref. 8:p. 4-11]
2. Analocry Estimates
Cost estimates by analogy are based upon relationships
to costs experienced for similar items (e.g., the ratio of
hardware to engineering costs based on ratios experienced in
similar programs). Current cost information on similar
systems or processes should be adjusted to reflect differences
between the systems or programs. The accuracy depends upon
the similarity to historical programs, as well as the adequacy
18
of any adjustments. Because this method relies on comparisons
to other programs and usually cannot assess cost drivers, it
is not as useful in assessing the effects of program or design
changes. [Ref. 8:p. 4-9]
3. Parametric Estimates
Parametric estimates use actual historical costs to
project relationships between cost elements and system or
process characteristics. Parameters such as size, weight, or
performance characteristics are used in estimating costs.
These statistically derived estimates are commonly called cost
estimating relationships (CERs). They are sensitive to design
and program changes and can identify cost drivers. While they
are less accurate than engineering estimates, they are often
used when the system is less well-defined. [Ref. l:p. 4-11]
The product, the amount of detail required, and the
data available will affect the choice of cost estimation
method. For example, contractors do not have access to the
cost history that DoD possesses (e.g., other contractor's
data). Thus, they rely more heavily on the bottom-up method.
On the other hand, DoD has little in-house capacity to use, or
check the use of, the engineering method and tends to rely
upon the parametric and analogy methods.
19
C. COST ELEMENTS
The costs that must be analyzed in the dual source
scenario are normally classified into nonrecurring and
recurring.
1. Nonrecurring Costs
Nonrecurring costs represent those costs incurred to
bring the second source on board as a viable competitor. They
may include special tooling and test equipment, facilities
cost, technical transfer, the costs of qualifying the second
source (e.g., testing and qualification of the qualification
buy), as well as contractor and Government management costs.
[Ref. 8:p. 2-13]
2. Recurring Cost
Recurring cost variables are defined by the Navy
Competition Handbook as "all cost elements that are subject to
dual sourcing such as prime mission equipment, warranties,
engineering change orders, and engineering services."
Additionally, it lists the following as key recurring
variables:
- Initial source first unit cost, cost improvement rate and
production rate factor.
- Second source first unit cost, cost improvement rate and
production rate factor
- Initial source price changes due to dual sourcing,
including changes in cost improvement. [Ref. 7:p. B-l]
Analysis of the decision to develop a second source is
extremely difficult because the analyst must make a projection
20
of costs for a hypothetical contractor for comparison to an
existing producer. Only in contractor teaming or leader-
follower might the analyst have insight into both of the
participant's anticipated behavior.
Another difficult task for an analyst is to predict
the rate and change of the progress curve. The progress curve
is defined as "including all recurring costs, amortized
capital, overhead and profit" as opposed to the learning curve
which "implies reductions in labor hours due to worker
learning." [Ref. 8:p. 4-9) Many factors influence the slope
of learning curves. Changes in production rate, tooling,
capital equipment, product design and management strategy may
influence the slope; however, their individual effects are
lost when lumped together in a progress curve. [Ref. 13:p.
28)
Both the progress curve and learning curve provide a
method of estimating unit costs or production time of future
units based upon the first unit and an assumption that the
contractor will become more efficient the longer he produces.
Because both are based upon the first unit, if the hours or
costs for this unit have not been controlled and are
artificially high, projections for subsequent units will be
inflated.
Any model evaluating the effects of competition will
require comparison of the historical nonrecurring cost to
establish competition, initial sole source recurring costs, an
21
estimate of the sole source cost for the completed quantity,
and estimates of both the original producer and second source
costs under competitive conditions. [Ref. 7:p. B-l]
D. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF COMPETITION
This section discusses the areas that must be addressed in
the analysis of the introduction of dual source competition
into a previously sole source program. Although there are
several models commonly used to estimate costs and evaluate
the effects of competition, they all basically apply the
following generic steps:
- Step 1: Estimate the investment and production cost of
the sole source supplier through the remainder of the
program.
- Step 2: Estimate the investment requirement to establish
the dual source production capability.
- Step 3: Estimate the cost of production by the original
source operating in a dual source, competitive
environment.
- Step 4: Estimate the cost of production by the second
source.
- Step 5: Compare the result of Step 1 (sole source) with
the sum of the results Steps 2, 3, and 4 (dual source).
The least costly alternative is selected. [Ref. 7:pp. B-
16]
An analysis of projected program costs should ensure that
total program savings are sufficient to pay for:
- Nonrecurring facilitization ccsts.
- Shortened production runs.






- Duplicative program management costs. [Ref. 8:p. 2-13]
In general, the economic variables that should be
considered in any cost benefit analysis include the total
quantity required, planned duration of production, progress or
price improvement curve, tooling and test equipment costs
(nonrecurring costs), the recurring costs of production, and
contractor capacity. Because several years may elapse between
the time nonrecurring costs are made and the point at which
the contractor can successfully compete, adjustments should be
considered for the time value of money.
All of the models used by the Navy to estimate and analyze
the effects of competition generally refer to and apply a
downward shift and rotation (steepening) of the progress or
price improvement curve (PIC) once production competition is
introduced. This change in the PIC, known as the "shift and
rotation" was first introduced in 1979 in "Predicting the
Costs and Benefits of Competitive Production Sources," a
report prepared by The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC).
[Ref. 14:p. 22] This theory was based on the assumption that
downward shifts and rotations would occur because the sole
source producer was capable of, but had no incentive to,
reduce his costs (or profit) prior to the introduction of
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competition. Only when the threat of competition was
introduced, would he immediately reduce his price to compete
and correct his inefficient processes which would result in a
steeper PIC slope.
Figure 1 is an example showing the effect of competition
on the sole source's curve both before and after introduction
of competition. It also projects the second source's expected









Figure 1. Shift and Rotation Effect
This "shift and rotation" effect has been criticized by
Dr. Michael N. Beltramo for its assumption that,
24
...the initial source has knowingly incorporated inefficien-
cies into its production process and/or is making excess
profits;...that virtually any second source can (and will)
achieve the same level of efficiency as the initial source
and that competitive prices set by both contractors will be
based upon their costs with a similar, but small profit
included. [Ref. 14:p. 6]
In evaluating the first competitive lot of ten dual source
programs, he noted a downward shift with an upward rotation in
five of the ten cases he studied. This would result in the
sole source's competitive learning curve eventually crossing
over its own sole source curve at some point. [Ref. 7:p. B-
16]
A Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) study of models used to
estimate the effects of competition also criticized the "shift
and rotation" effect as "too narrowly based" and suggested
that any economic model analyzing defense procurement must
consider "the institutional, technical and behavioral
characteristics of the defense procurement process." [Ref.
12:p. 3]
The Defense System Management Handbook for Program
Managers attempts to warn program managers to recognize the
danger of simply assuming the same "shift and rotation" for
all programs by discussing the following circumstances which
could affect the magnitude of the potential shift and
rotation:
- Intensity of the competition. If the original producer
perceives that the second source cannot be competitive,
perhaps due to inadequate technology transfer, the original
producer is less likely to offer price reductions.
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- Timing of the competition. If the competition is held
early in the production cycle when production risks still
remain, the original producer will be less willing to offer
large price reductions.
- Ability of the original producer to reduce costs. If the
system was competitively developed and the original producer
has demonstrated adequate cost control, the contractor may
not be capable of further price reductions. Conversely, if
the original developer has experienced significant cost
growth, competition may lead to greater control and large
cost reductions.
- System and manufacturing technology. If the manufacture
of the system requires complex processes and equipment, the
original producer may be unable to otter large price
reductions. [Ref. 8:p. 4-15]
While the circumstances above still would lead the program
manager to believe that the sole source contractor is
operating in an inefficient manner, at least it represents an
attempt to encourage the program manager to question the rate
of the shift and rotation effect.
Any economic analysis must include sensitivity analysis
not only of the progress curve and shift and rotation effect
but also of the total planned quantity and production rate, as
well as the timing of the competition. During an interview
with this author, Bruce Parker, an analyst in the Naval Sea
Systems Command Cost Analysis group (SEA-017), indicated that
in addition to sensitivity analysis in those areas, he also
considered other factors. Not only does he consider the
technology, timing of the competition, and total planned
quantities when looking at the rate of shift and rotation, he
also tries to evaluate the company's position in its industry
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(in general) and its business base (in particular) to try to
more accurately predict their pricing behavior. [Ref.16]
He also indicated that in the past he has been asked to
evaluate programs using inflated production quantities rather
than what was actually planned for, which in effect, skewed
the results in favor of initiating dual source competition.
He was unaware of whether any decisions to conduct dual source
competition had been based solely on his analyses. An example
of where a decision was actually made to proceed with an
alternate source based on an inflated production projection is
the case of the TOW missile. According to a recent article,
In the case of TOW, Hughes aircraft was required to
facilitize a capability to manufacture up to 30,000 a year.
The missile was then second-sourced, although the actual
budgets funded only 13,000-14,000 systems. Facilities for
a second source cost over $100 million, but that contractor
(Raytheon) produced only two missiles before acquisition
goals changed, and production was terminated in a winner-
take-all competition, won by Hughes. [Ref. 18:p. 42)
The methods available to the analyst/program manager
facilitate the prediction and comparison of the difference
between the unit cost which the sole source contractor would
experience both with and without competition to the projected
unit cost of the second source. In evaluating the sole source
price, the analyst must also consider the pricing behavior of
the sole source producer. Greer and Liao have hypothesized
three alternative strategies a firm may pursue in response to
competition:
- Constant percentage profit--price is a constant mark-up
over cost.
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- Penetration (limit) pricing--if the Government has not
committed to competition, the firm sets a price that is
low enough to discourage the introduction of competition.
- Skimming pricing--if the Government is committed to
competition, the firm sets a high price and lowers it as
necessary. [Ref. 19:p. 41]
Additionally, they have examined industry utilization as a
strategic consideration for contractors. According to their
study, during periods of high utilization, contractors are
unlikely to offer lower prices and conversely, during lean
periods, contractors will often offer substantially lower
prices to continue to work or stay in business. [Ref. 19:p.
41]
Beltramo has frequently cited the Stackleburg duopoly
model as a possible consideration when analyzing dual source
competition. The duopoly theory in split buy scenarios
implies two types of firms exist. The first firm may choose
to be the leader and through aggressive strategies in price or
quality pursue a dominant position in the market. Alterna-
tively, the other firm may have no desire to be dominant and
will adopt the follower strategy and accept a smaller
percentage of the total requirement at the higher (less
competitive, price. Effective competition can only occur when
both contractors are willing and able to pursue an aggressive
pricing strategy. [Ref. 13:p. 8]
Another important consideration in the economic analysis
of dual source competition is the question of the minimum
sustaining rate (MSR). This is the minimum quantity that must
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be awarded to the contractor with the higher/less competitive
price. There is no foolproof way to verify the contractor's
estimate of his MSR and since the Government has guaranteed
award of that amount contractors are prone to inflating their
bids for that quantity. (Ref. 20:p. 16]
E. SUMMARY
The economic analysis of costs and benefits of any
decision relating to a change in acquisition strategy will
require a comparison of actual costs unde:t current conditions
projected into the future, with an estimate of the future
costs given the change in the acquisition methodology.
Various models exist to allow an analyst to "plug and chug"
numbers to come up with a savings/loss. However, if the
institutional, technical and behavioral characteristics of the
process are not considered, the result may be flawed.
Consequently, the arithmetic is probably the easy part; the
answers to the economic questions that arise out of the
analysis are far more difficult to obtain and, in the long
run, are probably more important than the actual numbers
produced by the models.
The next chapter will present and discuss a decision model
to be used to help evaluate the decision to conduct a winner-
take-all competition for the remaining requirement, given the
reduction in requirements resulting from the reduction of
forces and budget cuts.
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IV. A DECISION MODEL TO CONTINUE/DISCONTINUE DUAL SOURCING
A. INTRODUCTION
Chapter III concluded that the simplified economic models
used by Navy program managers lend themselves to a fairly easy
mathematical solution to predict and estimate the effects of
competition. However, they fail to account for the strategic
behavior of contractors or to predict the real net effect of
the decision to pursue competitive production. Only by
further analysis of the purpose, acquisition method, price
improvement curve, pricing strategy practiced by the sole
source producer, total requirement, and planned production
rate can the program manager make a sound business decision to
proceed with the use of dual competition.
Faced with a reduced requirement and severely limited
resources to fund it, the program manager is challenged with
the problem of reevaluating costs and benefits of the program.
The models presently available lend themselves to working the
problem "backwards" to try to analyze the effect of a one time
competitive buy-out. Given that two sources are qualified and
co-producing, the variables in the equation should be fairly
easy to determine. However, just as in making an analysis of
whether or not to pursue a dual source strategy, the
Government analyst must have a thorough understanding of the
30
contxauLurs' esLimating methodologies, pricing Etrategies, and
cost information.
In working "backward" to try to predict the effects of
buying-out the remaining (reduced) requirements, one must once
again analyze the effects on nonrecurring and recurring costs,
as well as the contractors' expected pricing behavior. If the
hardware is a mature product, both producers will probably
have demonstrated and priced along a learning curve already
familiar to the Government. Therefore, the program manager
should have a fairly valid starting point upon which to
analyze the unit price in competition.
If both contractors have the tooling and capacity to
produce the remaining quantity, then the Government will
probably experience minimal nonrecurring costs associated with
the decision to down select to one source. However, if
neither is capable of producing an increased quantity during
the buy-out, the Government must weigh the costs of additional
tooling and production equipment against the projected savings
from a buy-out.
The cost of retooling the winner to increase his
production capacity may be offset by reduced unit cost due to
a higher production rate. Theoretically, an increased
production rate will result in a lower cost because of the
redistribution of indirect charges; overhead costs (e.g.,
depreciation of plant equipments and toolings, insurance,
utilities, etc.) are spread over larger quantities.
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Additionally, higher quantities may make it possible for the
contractor to take advantage of quantity discounts on parts or
materials. [Ref. 21:p. 20]
The flip side of the production rate question is the
effect upon the losing contractor in a buy-out scenario.
While the Government will "save" the expense of the loser's
indirect costs; if the losing contractor has other Government
business, those charges may simply shift to the other
programs. Consequently, while the program manager might
experience some benefit in only paying indirect charges for
one contractor vice two, the fixed cost portion of that
savings may end up as a ripple effect that increases costs for
other DoD programs!
Depending on the contractual arrangement the losing
contractor has with the Government, the program manager must
consider those costs associated with terminating the existing
contract. These costs can be quite substantial and must be
thoroughly evaluated. However, termination might present the
opportunity for the Government to procure the losing
contractor's tooling to be provided to the winner in order to
increase his capacity.
Finally, the recurring costs must be evaluated. However,
since the Navy has awarded most of the dual source contracts
using firm fixed price contracts and based the contract prices
on the fact that there was adequate price competition, actual
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historical cost data (as opposed to price) may not be readily
available.
While costs appear to be easily defined and categorized as
recurring or nonrecurring, in reality, they are often ill
defined and highly aggregated. For example, direct labor and
direct material are immediately associated with production and
therefore, could be easily classified as a recurring cost.
However, a significant amount of both direct labor and
material are often used to qualify a second source and should
be classified as nonrecurring when used for this purpose.
This ambiguity in classifying costs often makes the "after
the fact" computation of savings difficult unless detailed
data are available. For instance, if the nonrecurring
material and labor costs charged by the second source to build
the initial qualification units are accumulated and reported
as production costs, the program manager may erroneously
conclude that the second source unit cost is much higher than
the sole source unit cost. Table 1 illustrates some of the
more important cost elements and how they can be classified.
The decision to down select to a single source of supply
should involve a detailed cost-benefit analysis. In addItion
to the analysis, application of the decision model depicted in
Figure 2 will give the program manager another tool to use
when making the decision to continue the split buy or down
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Figure 2. A Proposed Decision Model
B. THE MODEL
1. Is the Proposed Dual Source Arrangement Cost
Effective?
The answer to this question requires a look back to
the initial decision to dual source and whether its savings
have paid for the nonrecurring investment costs. This is
easier said than done. A frequent criticism of the dual
source methodology is the failure to monitor and record
investment costs. A standard approach must be adopted to
measure all programs by the same yardstick. The approach must
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be tailored to specific program characteristics (e.g.,
electronic programs, missiles and missile components, or
shipbuilding) and must include all pertinent investment costs.
The argument could be made that these costs are "sunk costs";
however, to evaluate the net savings or loss, they must be
considered.
In evaluating cost effectiveness, one must also look
at why costs have come down. Have the contractors invested in
new facilities or innovative techniques that have contributed
to lower costs? Have aggressively-controlled overhead costs
contributed to the savings? Has quality and reliability
improved?
The Phalanx Close In Weapon System program highlighted
an important side effect of dual source competition. In
response to a Program Budget Decision (PBD) which directed a
competitive buy-out of several programs, ASN conducted a study
of the Phalanx program. The study predicted that in addition
to foregoing between $55-160 million in projected savings, the
decision to down select would result in "significant
engineering impacts" because of both contractors heavy
involvement in on going support and development efforts.
[Ref. 22:p. 2] The level of shared responsibilities between
the contractors can often be an important consideration.
Finally, is either source tooled for the buy-out
quantities? If not, the facilitization cost would have to be
weighed against the potential savings from production of
36
higher quantities. If the answers to all, or the majority, of
the above questions are yes, and if the quantitative cost-
benefit analysis indicates that down selecting to a single
source of supply will result in a cost increase, it would be
best to continue with the split buy. However, if there
appears to be no future benefit to ccntinued split buys, the
program manager must consider the next question.
2. Does the Industrial Base Reguire Two Suppliers?
If the initial dual source acquisition strategy was
solely to enhance the defense industrial base, the program
manager must redetermine whether Government intervention in
the form of directed buys are still necessary. Are economic
conditions, foreign competition or insufficient production
capacity still critical issues impacting the ability to surge
or mobilize in the event of emergency? The program manager
may have to conduct a market survey to determine whether other
sources of supply will be available should the decision be
made to no longer maintain a contractor through a directed
dual source. If the circumstances still warrant continued
support of the industrial base, then the decision to continue
to split buys would be appropriate. If the industrial base no
longer requires extraordinary support, the program manager
must consider the next question.
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3. Will Subseauent Increases in Quantities Make Dual
Source Again Viable?
The program manager should consider future needs,
foreign military sales, spares, training units, and system
variants when considering this issue. Both Navy and other
Service programs should be reviewed with the objective of
combining requirements. If both contractors have the capacity
and tooling for the higher buy-out quantities and increased
production rate, the program manager should consider the
probability of increased requirements in the future. If it
appears that spares, FMS, or joint Service requirements will
present competitive opportunities in the future, the program
manager should continue with split buys. If not, a one time
winner-take-all competition should be conducted to award the
remaining requirements.
Once the decision has been made to buy the remaining
requirement in a winner-take-all competition, the Government
must attempt to minimize its costs. Just as a downward shift
and rotation is often assumed, and may have occurred with the
introduction of competition, the Government must take measures
to minimize the winner's potential to exercise classic sole
source pricing behavior and introduce a deleterious shift and
rotation effect.
Because the quantity requirement, item configuration,
and funding at the point of buy-out will probably be stable,
and the program manager will probably have a high degree of
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confidence in both contractors' ability to perform, the
multiyear procurement (MYP) approach may present an
opportunity to reduce costs. The Acquisition Strategy Guide
defines MYP as:
...a method of acquiring more than one year's but not more
than five years' requirements under one contract. Each
program year is budgeted and funded annually, but the
commitment is for at least several years. [Ref. l:p. 5-39]
MYP is implemented through a multiyear contract which binds
the contractual parties to a longer and more stable
relationship. The FAR defines a multiyear contract as "a
contract covering more that 1-year's but not in excess of 5-
years' requirements...funds need only to have been
appropriated for the first year." [Ref. 9:17.101]
In multiyear contracts, demand is fixed at the time of
contract formation, allowing for more accurate production and
material requirements forecasting. Therefore, because it
provides a longer Government commitment to the contractor, MYP
may result in savings from improved economies and efficiencies
in the production process, economies-of-scale lot buying,
decreased financial borrowing, better utilization of
industrial facilities, and a reduction in the administrative
burden to both the contractor and Government.
However, the potential for savings only exists if both
competitors are willing and able to pursue an aggressive
pricing strategy. Additionally, while a multiyear contract
commits the Government to a contract extending beyond one
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year, funds are still made available by Congress on an annual
basis. Should Congress fail to fund the remainder of a
multiyear contract, the Government is still liable for certain
costs associated with the contractor's "upfront" incurrence of
material or facilitization costs in his efforts to achieve
outyear economies.
While multiyear contracting offers the potential for
savings and cost containment, its use must be approved by
Congress. Over the years, Congress has enacted restrictive
legislation associated with multiyear contracting. One of the
main reasons Congress has been reluctant to approve MYP
programs may lie in its reluctance to forfeit control over
major programs. Once designated multiyear, a program cannot
be modified or canceled without incurring substantial
penalties. However, if properly monitored, multiyear
contracting can offer a win-win proposition to both the
Government and the contractor. The Government can realize the
benefits of competition; and through the use of a fixed price
contract, the contractor has incentive to control his costs
and maximize his profit.
Another method of controlling costs is by the use of
a fixed price contract with options. This method of
contracting does not offer the same type of opportunity for
cost savings as multiyear. This method seems to favor the
Government, in that, even though the contract is awarded with
a base year and options, the Government is legally required to
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test the market prior to exercising the options and may turn
to another source of supply. Therefore, the contractor loses
some of his flexibility to price strategically because he must
make his pricing decision at the point of the competitive buy-
out, with no guarantee of future business. The use of a base
year with option years protects the Government in the event
the requirements change. However, because the contractor has
no guarantee that the options will be exercised, he has no
incentive to take on the risk of ordering material in economic
quantities in the base year to minimize the costs of the
outyear requirements.
Another tool the Government could employ to discourage
the winner in a buy out situation from taking advantage of a
sole source position could be to pay the loser to maintain his
tooling. The major drawback to this alternative lies in the
problem associated with estimating the cost of storing or
relocating production equipment, tooling and fixtures.
Additionally, unless the contractor is a multiproduct firm,
the costs to lay-off and subsequently rehire could be
prohibitive. However, if this alternative were possible, with
the tooling available, the loser might still pose a
competitive threat should circumstances change. Another
alternative available to the Government would be to simply
purchase as much of the tooling as possible to be used as GFE
should the need arise.
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As previously stated, in many cases the Government has
not always had access to detailed cost and pricing data or
historical costs. The lack of data severely restricts the
Government's ability to estimate the effects of a change in
acquisition strategy. Regardless of the method the Government
uses to acquire the remaining requirements, cost data must be
obtained. The visibility of cost and pricing data during the
buy-out coupled with visibility of actual costs as they are
incurred will enable the program manager to limit the winning
contractor's ability to introduce a price-increasing shift of
the PIC. The requirement to provide the cost data will
probably increase the cost of the buy-out; however, it may be
a small price to pay to provide the program manager with a
valuable tool to control costs if properly used.
C. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the questions and issues which
the program manager must address when making the decision to
down select to one source of supply given the scenario of
significantly reduced requirements. The decision model is an
additional tool to be used to look at some of the more
subjective questions associated with such a decision.
Finally, several recommendations are offered as a method of
protecting the Government's position given a return to a
single source of supply.
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V. SUMMARY AND ANSWERS TO RESEARCH OUESTIONS
A. SUMMARY
This thesis has examined the rationale for using a dual
source acquisition method, and has described the various means
of accomplishing technical transfer and identified the
economic issues the program manager must consider when
evaluating dual sources. The major reasons Navy policy has
emphasized dual source competition as an acquisition method
are ensuring quality, obtaining a lower price and protecting
the industrial base.
The most common methods of achieving technology transfer
and generating second sources are the following:
- Fit-form-function (F3).




These techniques vary in their complexity and cost in
accomplishing the transfer of technical information from the
Government and between contractors.
While the program manager has various methods he/she might
use to develop alternate sources, an indepth cost/benefit and
economic analysis must be made prior to the decision to use
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dual sources as an acquisition method. The questions and
issues that must be addressed are summarized as follows:
- The decision must be based on a realistic requirement and
production rate profile.
- Any cost/benefit analysis will include examination of the
experience curve projections and discussion of the
expected behavior during sole-source and dual source
conditions, as well as sensitivity analysis of varying
production rates.
- Analysis of the nonrecurring costs of tooling and test
equipment.
- The cost of educational buys and qualification testing.
The additional costs resulting from smaller buys from the
prime contractor during the learning and second source
qualification period.
- A market analysis of the vendors capable of producing the
desired system.
The program manager has various methods available to analyze
his/her decision. These methods range from informal back-of-
the-envelope calculations to software developed specifically
for this purpose. However, any conclusion must be based upon
and include an understanding and analysis of cost estimating
methods, cost elements, pricing behavior, derivation of the
experience curve, and the effect of any shift or rotation as
well as the variables driving the movement of the experience
curve.
In short, while the analyst can come up with variables to
use in cost/benefit models, the answer the model provides is
only as good as the information upon which it is based. The
models can perform calculations; however, the answers to the
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economic questions that come from the analysis really add
substance to any decision process.
Ironically, when faced with the requirement to analyze the
effects of reduced quantities and to decide whether or not to
down select to one source of supply, the analysis requires the
same basic intuition and calculations necessary in making the
decision to pursue dual sources. The program manager must
consider the pricing strategy, effect on the experience curve,
effects on recurring and nonrecurring costs and quantity/
production rates.
In conclusion, the program manager must understand the
variables he/she is using to compute a bottom line figure when
doing a cost/benefit analysis. He/she must consider the
timing of entering into or backing away from competition; the
intensity of the competition between the sources; the "'ility
of the producers to further reduce costs or in the case of a
buy-out, maintain the same PIC; and finally, the state of the
technology and other business base issues.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED
The primary and subsidiary research questions are restated
below.
- What will be the impact on production cost. aiven the
decision to revert to a single source from a dual source
accuisition method, and how might these be minimized?
- What are the essential differences between the key
production costs when going from dual sources to a single
source?
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- What action should the Government and contractor take to
minimize production costs?
- Can a model be developed to determine which programs are
no longer candidates for dual source acquisition?
- What can be expected in pricing during buy-out?
The first two questions are intertwined and cannot be
answered definitively as the effects will vary with each
specific program. However, since a buy-out will normally
result in a higher production rate for the winner, the
production costs may be affected in two ways. First,
additional nonrecurring costs might be necessary if neither
contractor is tooled for the buy-out quantities. However, the
object of the analysis is to ensure these additional costs are
offset by savings due to a lower unit cost realized when the
fixed costs are spread over the winner's higher production
ratc. An additional source of savings which might be realized
with an increased production rate stems from the winning
contractor's ability to get quantity discounts from his
suppliers for parts or materials.
If the winner must be retooled for higher quantities and
hire more production workers, he might experience a negative
rotation in his experience curve that could result in a higher
unit cost. Also, should the buy-out quantity result in a
lower rate of production, the Government may be exposed to the
costs of laying off workers and the cost of dismantling,
moving or storing production equipment.
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Additionally, in a buy-out scenario, since the Government
is no longer paying the indirect costs for two sources, the
loser's indirect costs can be considered "saved." However,
these costs ultimately may be reflected in other Government
programs as they are redistributed over the contractor's
remaining business base.
The program manager has several means to minimize the
effects on production costs. The most important tool is his/
her understanding of the contractors' behavior at the point
when competition was introduced, as well as their subsequent
behavior throughout the period of competition. By
understanding the contractors' estimating methods, pricing
strategies and motivation for continued government business,
the program manager can more accurately estimate the
contractors' behavior when faced with a winner-take-all buy-
out.
Since the program manager should have some visibility of
the historical costs under competition, he/she may have a
basis for each contractor's experience curve; and therefore,
a baseline to establish cost control measures for the winner
of the buy-out. The use of either a multiyear contract or a
base year contract with priced options will give the program
manager some leverage in holding down the contractor's cost
during buy-out. The cost to the Government will only be
minimized by contract type if both contractors are willing to
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pursue an aggressive pricing strategy during head to head
competition.
The multiyear method seems to offer the most potential for
both the Government and the contractor to minimize costs. By
providing a longer Government commitment to the contractor, it
may allow him to realize savings from improved economies and
efficiencies in the production process, economy of scale lot
buying, better utilization of facilities and personnel and a
possible reduction in the administrative burden to the
Government.
The use of the base year with option method offers a less
attractive means of controlling costs. If the contractor is
bidding aggressively it forces him to commit to "showing his
hand" during buy-out, and yet reserves the right to the
Government of recompeting the option years. Thus, the threat
of competition remains over the winning contractor's head.
Another method of continuing the threat of competition is by
paying the losing contractor to maintain his tooling, or
buying the tooling to be provided as GFE, should the need to
reintroduce competition arise.
A final method, and in this researcher's opinion, the most
important tool in controlling costs, is to acquire cost and
pricing data during the buy-out and require the winning
contractor to provide actual cost data during the period of
performance. While this requirement may result in higher
program costs for data, it will be money well spent should the
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need to recompete arise. The more visibility the program
manager has into the contractor's costs, the more power he/she
has to contain those costs.
No economic model exists to determine candidates to be
down selected to one source of supply given a sudden reduction
in requirements. This researcher was unable to obtain data on
programs which would provide sufficient detail to develop a
meaningful quantitative model. The current methodology can be
applied to help the program manager quantify his/her decision,
and a simple decision mrdel is provided to highlight some of
the more subjective areas the program manager must also
consider in any decision to change the program acquisition
strategy.
In conclusion, any decision will require a cost/benefit
analysis to try to quantify the effects of any change.
However, any projected cost/saving must be based upon a
thorough analysis of all variables considered. Additionally,
good business judgment dictates that the program manager
congider other issues such as contractor motivation, business/
industrial base considerations, and future political
considerations when making his/her decision.
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
- Study the actual buy-out behavior in specific programs
under the conditions of a reduced requirement.
- Study contractors' behavior during dual source
acquisition. Did they become more etficient by
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modernization and advanced technology, or did they take
less profit?
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